The household's labor margin has substantial effects on risk aversion, and hence asset prices, in dynamic equilibrium models even when utility is additively separable between consumption and labor. This paper derives simple, closed-form expressions for risk aversion that take into account the household's labor margin. Ignoring this margin can dramatically overstate the household's true aversion to risk. Risk premia on assets priced with the stochastic discount factor increase essentially linearly with risk aversion, so measuring risk aversion correctly is crucial for asset pricing in the model. Closed-form expressions for risk aversion in models with generalized recursive preferences and internal and external habits are also derived.
Introduction
In a static, one-period model with household utility u(·) defined over a single consumption good, Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) defined the coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion, −u (c)/u (c) and −c u (c)/u (c). Difficulties immediately arise, however, when one attempts to generalize these concepts to the case of many periods or many goods (e.g., Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1974) . These difficulties are particularly pronounced in a dynamic equilibrium model with labor, in which there is a double infinity of goods to considerconsumption and labor in every future period and state of nature-all of which may vary in response to a typical shock to asset returns or wealth.
The present paper shows how to compute risk aversion in dynamic equilibrium models.
First, we verify that risk aversion depends on the partial derivatives of the household's value function V with respect to wealth a-that is, the coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion are essentially −V aa /V a and −aV aa /V a , respectively. Even though closed-form solutions for the value function do not exist in general, we can derive simple, closed-form expressions for risk aversion at the model's steady state, or along a balanced growth path, by using the fact that the derivative of the value function with respect to wealth equals the current-period marginal utility of consumption (Benveniste and Scheinkman, 1979) . Importantly, these closed-form expressions for risk aversion seem to remain good approximations even far away from the model's steady state.
A main result of the paper is that the household's labor margin has substantial effects on risk aversion, and hence asset prices. Even when labor and consumption are additively separable in utility, they remain connected by the household's budget constraint: in particular, the household can absorb shocks to asset returns either through changes in consumption, changes in hours worked, or some combination of the two. This ability to absorb shocks along either or both margins greatly alters the household's attitudes toward risk. For example, if the household's utility kernel is given by u(c t , l t ) = c 1−γ t /(1 − γ) − ηl t , the quantity −c u 11 /u 1 = γ is often referred to as the household's coefficient of relative risk aversion, but in fact the household is risk neutral with respect to gambles over asset values or wealth.
Intuitively, the household is indifferent at the margin between using labor or consumption to absorb a shock to assets, and the household in this example is clearly risk neutral with respect to gambles over hours. More generally, when u(c t , l t ) = c
risk aversion equals (γ −1 + χ −1 ) −1 , a combination of the parameters on the household's consumption and labor margins, reflecting that the household absorbs shocks using both margins.
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While modeling risk neutrality is not a main goal of the present paper, risk neutrality nevertheless can be a desirable feature for some applications, such as labor market search or financial frictions, since it allows for closed-form solutions to key features of the model.
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Thus, an additional contribution of the present paper is to show ways of modeling risk neutrality that do not require utility to be linear in consumption, which has undesirable implications for interest rates and consumption growth. Instead, any utility kernel with a singular Hessian matrix can be used.
A final result of the paper is that risk premia computed using the Lucas-Breeden stochastic discounting framework are essentially linear in risk aversion. That is, measuring risk aversion correctly-taking into account the household's labor margin-is necessary for understanding asset prices in the model. Since much recent research has focused on bringing dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models into closer agreement with asset prices, 3 it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to measuring risk aversion correctly in these models. The present paper aims to fill that void.
Closed-form expressions and extensions of the above results to dynamic equilibrium models with generalized recursive preferences (e.g., Epstein and Zin, 1989, Weil, 1989 ) and habits (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999 ) are also derived.
There are a few previous studies that extend the Arrow-Pratt definition beyond the one-good, one-period case. In a static, multiple-good setting, Stiglitz (1969) measures risk aversion using the household's indirect utility function rather than utility itself, essentially a special case of Proposition 1 of the present paper. Constantinides (1990) measures risk aversion in a dynamic, consumption-only (endowment) economy using the household's value function, another special case of Proposition 1. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) apply
Constantinides' definition to some very simple endowment economy models for which they 1 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in this example is 1/γ, so a corollary of this result is that risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are nonreciprocal when labor supply can vary. 2 See, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) .
can compute closed-form expressions for the value function, and hence risk aversion. The present paper builds on these studies by deriving closed-form solutions for risk aversion in dynamic equilibrium models in general, demonstrating the importance of the labor margin,
and showing the tight link between risk aversion and asset prices in these models.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines the dynamic equilibrium framework within which we study risk aversion. Section 3 presents the main ideas of the paper, deriving risk aversion in dynamic equilibrium models for the time-separable expected utility case. Section 4 demonstrates the close connection between risk aversion and asset pricing in the Lucas-Breeden framework. Section 5 extends the analysis to the case of generalized recursive preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989) , which have been the focus of much recent research at the boundary between macroeconomics and finance. Section 6 extends the analysis to the case of internal and external habits, two of the most common intertemporal nonseperabilities in preferences in both the macroeconomics and finance literatures. Section 7 solves for risk aversion numerically and shows the accuracy of the closed-form expressions.
Section 8 discusses some general implications and concludes. An Appendix provides details of proofs and computations that are outlined in the main text.
Dynamic Equilibrium Framework

The Household's Optimization Problem and Value Function
Time is discrete and continues forever. At each time t, the household seeks to maximize the expected present discounted value of utility flows:
subject to the sequence of asset accumulation equations:
and the no-Ponzi-scheme condition:
where E t denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on the household's information
In addition to Assumption 1, a few more technical conditions are required to ensure the value function for the household's optimization problem exists and satisfies the Bellman equation (Stokey and Lucas (1990) , Rincón-Zapatera and Rodríguez-Palmero (2003) , and Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010) give different sets of such sufficient conditions). The details of these conditions are tangential to the present paper, so we simply assume:
Assumption 2. The value function V : X → R for the household's optimization problem exists and satisfies the Bellman equation:
where a t+1 is given by (2).
Together, Assumptions 1-2 guarantee the existence of a unique optimal choice for (c t , l t ) at each point in time, given (a t ; θ t ). Let c * t ≡ c * (a t ; θ t ) and l * t ≡ l * (a t ; θ t ) denote the household's optimal choices of c t and l t as functions of the state (a t ; θ t ). Then V can be written as:
where a *
To avoid boundary solutions, we make the following standard assumption:
It is important to note that Assumptions 5-6 do not prohibit us from offering an individual household a hypothetical gamble of the type described below. The steady state of the model serves only as a reference point around which the aggregate variables w, r, d, and θ and the other households' choices of c, l, and a can be predicted with certainty. This reference point is important because it is there that we can compute closed-form expressions for risk aversion.
Risk Aversion
The Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion
The household's risk aversion at time t generally depends on the household's state vector at time t, (a t ; θ t ). Given this state, we consider the household's aversion to a hypothetical one-shot gamble in period t of the form:
where ε t+1 is a random variable representing the gamble, with bounded support [ε, ε] , mean zero, unit variance, independent of θ τ for all τ , and independent of a τ , c τ , and l τ for all
A few words about (6) are in order: First, the gamble is dated t + 1 to clarify that its outcome is not in the household's information set at time t. Second, c t cannot be made the subject of the gamble without substantial modifications to the household's optimization problem, because c t is a choice variable under control of the household at time t. However, (6) is clearly equivalent to a one-shot gamble over net transfers d t or asset returns r t , both of which are exogenous to the household. Indeed, thinking of the gamble as being over r t helps to illuminate the connection between (6) and the price of risky assets, to which we will return in Section 4. As shown there, the household's aversion to the gamble in (6) is directly linked to the premium households require to hold risky assets.
Following Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) , we can ask what one-time fee μ the household would be willing to pay in period t to avoid the gamble in (6):
The quantity μ that makes the household just indifferent between (6) and (7) 
where V 1 and V 11 denote the first and second partial derivatives of V with respect to its first argument. Evaluated at the steady state, (8) simplifies to:
Proof: See Appendix.
Equations (8)-(9) are essentially Constantinides' (1990) definition of risk aversion, and have obvious similarities to Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) . Here, of course, it is the curvature of the value function V with respect to assets that matters, rather than the curvature of the utility kernel u with respect to consumption.
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Deriving the coefficient of absolute risk aversion in Proposition 1 is simple enough, but the problem with (8)- (9) is that closed-form expressions for V (and hence V 1 and V 11 ) do not exist in general, even for the simplest dynamic models with labor. This difficulty may help to explain the popularity of "shortcut" approaches to measuring risk aversion, notably −u 11 (c hence risk aversion-for some very simple, consumption-only endowment economy models.
This approach is a nonstarter for even the simplest dynamic models with labor.
We solve this problem by observing that V 1 and V 11 often can be computed even when closed-form solutions for V cannot be. For example, the Benveniste-Scheinkman equation:
states that the marginal value of a dollar of assets equals the marginal utility of consumption times 1 + r t (the interest rate appears here because beginning-of-period assets in the model generate income in period t). In (10), u 1 is a known function. Although closed-form solutions for the functions c * and l * are not known in general, the points c * t and l * t often are knownfor example, when they are evaluated at the nonstochastic steady state, c and l. Thus, we can compute V 1 at the nonstochastic steady state by evaluating (10) at that point.
We compute V 11 by noting that (10) holds for general a t ; hence we can differentiate (10) to yield:
All that remains is to find the derivatives ∂c * t /∂a t and ∂l * t /∂a t . We solve for ∂l * t /∂a t by differentiating the household's intratemporal optimality condition:
with respect to a t , and rearranging terms to yield:
where
Note that, if consumption and leisure in period t are normal goods, then λ t > 0, although we do not require this restriction below. It now only remains to solve for the derivative ∂c * t /∂a t . Intuitively, ∂c * t /∂a t should not be too difficult to compute: it is just the household's marginal propensity to consume today out of a change in assets, which we can deduce from the household's Euler equation and budget constraint. Differentiating the Euler equation:
with respect to a t yields:
Substituting in for ∂l * t /∂a t gives:
Evaluating (17) at steady state, β = (1 + r) −1 , λ t = λ t+1 = λ, and the u ij cancel, giving:
In other words, whatever the change in the household's consumption today, it must be the same as the expected change in consumption tomorrow, and the expected change in consumption at each future date t + k.
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The household's budget constraint is implied by asset accumulation equation (2) 
That is, the expected present value of changes in household consumption must equal the change in assets (times 1 + r) plus the expected present value of changes in labor income.
Combining (20) with (13) 
In response to a unit increase in assets, the household raises consumption in every period by the extra asset income r (the "golden rule"), adjusted downward by the amount 1 + wλ that takes into account the household's decrease in labor income. internal habits, which we will consider in Section 6, the individual household's optimal consumption response to a change in assets increases with time, even starting from steady state.
We can now compute the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Substituting (10), (11), (13)- (14), and (21) 
Proof: The assumptions and steps leading up to Proposition 2, adjusted to the onedimensional case, are essentially the same as the above with λ t = 0.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 are remarkable. First, the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion in (23) is just the traditional measure, −u 11 /u 1 , times r, which translates assets into current-period consumption. In other words, for any utility kernel u, the traditional, static measure of risk aversion is also the correct measure in the dynamic context, regardless of whether or not u is homothetic or the rest of the model is homogeneous, whether or not we can solve for V , and no matter what the functional forms of u and V .
More generally, when households have a labor margin, Proposition 2 shows that risk aversion is less than the traditional measure by the factor 1 + wλ, even when consumption and labor are additively separable in u (i.e., u 12 = 0). Even in the additively separable case, households can partially absorb shocks to income through changes in hours worked.
As a result, c * t depends on household labor supply, so labor and consumption are indirectly connected through the budget constraint.
10 When u 12 = 0, risk aversion in Proposition 2 is 10 Uhlig (2007) notes that, if households have Epstein-Zin preferences, then leisure must be taken into account in pricing assets because the value function V appears in the stochastic discount factor, and V depends on leisure. The present paper makes the point that the labor margin affects asset prices even in the case of additively separable expected utility preferences, because the labor margin changes the household's consumption process. The present paper also derives closed-form expressions for risk aversion, relates them to asset prices, and shows that those expression remain good approximations away from the steady state.
further attenuated or amplified by the direct interaction between consumption and labor in utility, u 12 .
The household's labor margin can have dramatic effects on risk aversion. For example, no matter how large the traditional measure −u 11 /u 1 , the household can still be risk neutral:
12 , the discriminant of u. The household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion (22) vanishes as Δ → 0, so long as either u 1 = −u 2 or u 12 < max{|u 11 |, |u 22 |} in the limit.
Proof: The corollary is stated as a limiting result to respect concavity in Assumption 1. Substituting out λ and w, (22) vanishes as Δ → 0 except for the special case u 1 = −u 2 and u 11 = −u 12 = u 22 (i.e., the case where u(c, l) =ũ(c − l) to second order for some functionũ). The corollary rules out that case by assumption.
In other words, risk aversion depends on the concavity of u in all dimensions rather than just in one dimension. Even when u 11 is very large, the household still can be risk neutral if u 22 is small or the cross-effect u 12 is sufficiently large. Geometrically, if there exists any direction in (c, l)-space along which u is flat, the household will optimally choose to absorb shocks to income along that line, resulting in risk-neutral behavior.
We provide some more concrete examples of risk aversion calculations in Section 3.3, below, after first defining relative risk aversion.
The Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion
The difference between absolute and relative risk aversion is the size of the hypothetical gamble faced by the household. If the household faces a one-shot gamble of size A t in period t, that is:
or the household can pay a one-time fee A t μ in period t to avoid this gamble, then it follows from Proposition 1 that the household's coefficient of risk aversion, lim σ→0 2μ(σ)/σ 2 , for this gamble is given by:
The natural definition of A t , considered by Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) , is the household's wealth at time t. The gamble in (24) is then over a fraction of the household's wealth and (25) is referred to as the household's coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In models with labor, however, household wealth can be more difficult to define because of the presence of human capital. In these models, there are two natural definitions of human capital, so we consequently define two measures of household wealth A t and two coefficients of relative risk aversion (25).
First, when the household's time endowment is not well-defined-as when u(c t ,
and no upper boundl on l t is specified, orl is specified but is completely arbitrary-it is most natural to define human capital as the present discounted value of labor income, w t l * t . Equivalently, total household wealth A t equals the present discounted value of consumption, which follows from the budget constraint (2)-(3). We state this formally as:
Definition 2. The household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by (25), with
, the present discounted value of household consumption, and where m t,τ denotes the stochastic discount factor
The factor (1 + r t ) −1 in the definition expresses wealth A t in beginning-rather than endof-period-t units, so that in steady state A = c/r and the consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
Alternatively, when the household's time endowmentl is well specified, we can define human capital to be the present discounted value of the household's time endowment, w tl . In thise case, total household wealthÃ t equals the present discounted value of leisure w t (l − l * t ) plus consumption c * t , from (2)-(3). We thus have:
Definition 3. The household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by (25), with
In steady state,Ã = c + w(l − l) /r, and the leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
Of course, (26) and (27) 
Examples
Some simple examples illustrate how ignoring the household's labor margin can lead to wildly inaccurate measures of the household's true attitudes toward risk. Example 1. Consider the additively separable utility kernel:
where γ, χ, η > 0. The traditional measure of risk aversion for this utility kernel is −c u 11 /u 1 = γ, but the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by (26):
The household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion (27) is not well defined in this example (the household's risk aversion can be made arbitrarily In steady state, c ≈ wl, 11 so (29) can be written as:
Note that (30) small because household labor supply is essentially fixed. 12 However, as χ approaches 0, a common benchmark in the literature, the bias explodes and true risk aversion approaches zero-the household becomes risk neutral. Intuitively, households with linear disutility of work are risk neutral with respect to gambles over wealth because they can completely offset those gambles at the margin by working more or fewer hours, and households with linear disutility of work are clearly risk neutral with respect to gambles over hours.
Example 2. Consider the King-Plosser-Rebelo-type (1988) utility kernel:
where γ > 0, γ = 1, χ > 0,l = 1, and χ(1 − γ) < γ for concavity. The traditional measure of risk aversion for (31) is γ, but the household's actual leisure-and-consumptionbased coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
Note that concavity of (31) implies that (32) is positive. As in the previous example, (32) depends on both γ and χ, and can lie anywhere between 0 and the traditional measure γ, depending on χ. In this example, risk aversion is less than the traditional measure by the amount χ(1 − γ). As χ approaches γ/(1 − γ)-that is, as utility approaches Cobb-Douglasthe household becomes risk neutral; in this case, household utility along the line c t = w t (1−l t ) is linear, so the household finds it optimal to absorb shocks to wealth along that line.
The household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is a bit more complicated than (32):
Again, (33) is a combination of the parameters γ and χ, and can lie anywhere between 0 and γ, depending on χ. Neither (32) nor (33) equals the traditional measure γ, except for the special case χ = 0.
Risk Aversion and Asset Pricing
In the preceding sections, we showed that the labor margin has important implications for Arrow-Pratt risk aversion with respect to gambles over income or wealth. We now show that risk aversion with respect to these gambles is also the right concept for asset pricing.
Measuring Risk Aversion with V As Opposed to u
Some comparison of the expressions −V 11 /V 1 and −u 11 /u 1 helps to clarify why the former measure is the relevant one for pricing assets, such as stocks or bonds, in the model. From
Proposition 1, −V 11 /V 1 is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion for gambles over income or wealth in period t. In contrast, the expression −u 11 /u 1 is the risk aversion coefficient for a hypothetical gamble in which the household is forced to consume immediately the outcome of the gamble. Clearly, it is the former concept that corresponds to the stochastic payoffs of a standard asset, such as a stock or bond, in a DSGE model. In order for −u 11 /u 1 to be the relevant measure for pricing a security, it is not enough that the security pay off in units of consumption in period t + 1. The household would additionally have to be prevented from adjusting its consumption and labor choices in period t + 1 in response to the security's payoffs, so that the household is forced to absorb those payoffs into period t + 1 consumption. It is difficult to imagine such a security-all standard securities in financial markets correspond to gambles over income or wealth, for which the −V 11 /V 1 measure of risk aversion is the appropriate one.
Risk Aversion, the Stochastic Discount Factor, and Risk Premia
Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, and hence the labor margin, is also closely tied to asset prices in the standard Lucas-Breeden stochastic discounting framework.
denote the household's stochastic discount factor and let p t denote the cum-dividend price of a risky asset at time t, with E t p t+1 normalized to unity. The percentage difference between the risk-neutral price of the asset and its actual price-the risk premium on the asset-is given by: 
to first order. The expression for dc * t+1 is somewhat more complicated:
Lemma 6. To first order, evaluated at the steady state,
The expression follows from (2), (3), and (15). See the Appendix for details.
For the Arrow-Pratt one-shot gamble considered in Section 3, the aggregate variables w, r, and d were held constant, so (36)-(37) reduce to (13) and (21) in that case. The term in square brackets in (37) describes the change in the present value of household income, and thus the first line of (37) describes the income effect on consumption. The last line of (37) describes the substitution effect: changes in consumption due to changes in current and future wages and interest rates. (Recall −u 1 / c(u 11 − λu 12 ) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.)
We are now in a position to relate risk aversion to asset prices and risk premia:
Proposition 7. The household's stochastic discount factor satisfies
to first order, evaluated at steady state. The risk premium in (34) is given to second order around the steady state by:
Cov t (dp t+1 , dÂ t+1 ) + Cov t (dp t+1 , dΨ t+1 ),
where dÂ t+1 denotes the change in wealth given by the quantity in square brackets in (38) and dΨ t+1 denotes the change in wages and interest rates given by the second line of (38).
Proof: Substituting (36)- (37) into (35) 14 Proposition 7 also generalizes Merton's (1973) ICAPM to the case of variable labor.
In (39), the first term is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion times the covariance of the asset price with household wealth, while the second term captures the asset's ability to hedge against intertemporal shocks (Merton's "changes in investment opportunities"). The 13 This relationship also holds for the more general case of Epstein-Zin preferences, where it is easier to imagine varying risk aversion while holding the covariances in the model constant. See Section 5, below, and Rudebusch and Swanson (2009) . 14 Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) argue that it is u 11 /u 1 rather than V 11 /V 1 that matters for the equity premium in their Figure 2 . As shown here, it is V 11 /V 1 that is crucial. What explains Boldrin et al.'s Figure 2 is that the covariance of equity prices with the short-term interest rate is not held constant-in particular, the variance of the risk-free rate changes greatly over the points in their Figure 2 .
first term can vanish if households are Arrow-Pratt risk neutral (that is, risk neutral in a cross-sectional or CAPM sense), but the second term remains nonzero because an asset that pays off well when future wages are low or interest rates are high (and hence future consumption is low) is preferable to an asset that pays off poorly in those situations.
Finally, Proposition 7 implies that it is no harder or easier to match asset prices in a dynamic equilibrium model with labor than it is in such a model without labor. A given level of risk aversion in a DSGE model with labor, measured correctly, will generate just as large a risk premium as the same level of risk aversion in a DSGE model without labor, for a given set of model covariances. Thus, the equity premium is not any harder to match, or any more puzzling, in dynamic models with labor than in consumption-only models.
We conclude this section by noting that the risk premium is essentially linear in relative as well as absolute risk aversion, using an appropriate measure of covariance:
Corollary 8. In terms of relative risk aversion, the risk premium in (39) can be written as:
Cov t dp t+1 , dÂ t+1 A + Cov t (dp t+1 , dΨ t+1 ),
or:
where A andÃ are as in Definitions 2-3, and dÂ t+1 and dΨ t+1 are as defined in Proposition 7.
Proof: See Appendix. 
Risk Aversion with Generalized Recursive Preferences
We now turn to the case of generalized recursive preferences, as in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) . The household's asset accumulation equation (2) and no-Ponzi condition (3) are the same as in Section 2, but instead of maximizing (1), the household chooses c t and l t to maximize the generalized Bellman equation:
where α ∈ R, α = 1. 16 Note that (42) is the same as (4), but with the value function "twisted" and "untwisted" by the coefficient 1 − α. When α = 0, the preferences given by (42) reduce to the special case of expected utility. In order for the household's optimization problem to be well-defined, we require:
Assumption 7. The generalized value function V : X → R satisfying (42) exists.
If u ≥ 0 everywhere, then Epstein and Zin (1989) and Marinacci and Montruchhio (2010) provide sufficient conditions for Assumption 7 to be satisfied. If u ≤ 0 everywhere, then it is natural to let V ≤ 0 and replace (42) with:
and sufficient conditions for Assumption 7 are similar. To avoid the possibility of complex numbers arising in the maximand of (42) or (43), we require:
The main advantage of generalized recursive preferences (42) is that they allow for greater flexibility in modeling risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In (42), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution over deterministic consumption paths is exactly the same as in (4), but the household's risk aversion with respect to gambles can be amplified (or attenuated) by the additional parameter α.
Coefficients of Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion
Risk aversion continues to be given by Definition 1, where V is understood to mean the more general formulation in (42) or (43). The following proposition shows that risk aversion is well-defined and satisfies a generalized version of equations (8)- (9):
16 We exclude the case α = 1 here for simplicity. Note that, traditionally, Epstein-Zin preferences over consumption streams have been written as:
, but by setting V = V ρ and α = 1 − α/ρ, this can be seen to correspond to (42). 17 It is not currently known how to define Epstein-Zin preferences when u can take on both positive and negative values, although Example 5, below, suggests one approach.
Proposition 9. Let (a t ; θ t ) be an interior point of X and let V be given by (42) or (43). The household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion at (a t ; θ t ) exists and equals:
Evaluated at steady state, (44) simplifies to:
The first term in (45) is the same as the expected utility case (9), while the second term in (45) Proposition 9 is particularly important because, unlike Proposition 1, there is no preexisting "folk wisdom" in the profession regarding how to compute risk aversion for EpsteinZin preferences with labor. Risk aversion for these preferences has only been computed previously in homothetic, isoelastic, consumption-only models where the value function can be computed in closed form. Proposition 9 and Proposition 10, below, do not require u to be homothetic or the rest of the model to be homogenous, are valid for general and unknown functional forms V , and allow for the presence of labor.
Equation (45) also highlights an important feature of risk aversion with generalized recursive preferences: it is not invariant with respect to additive shifts of the utility kernel, except for the special case of expected utility (α = 0). because the level of V enters into the right-hand side of (45). That is, the utility kernels u(·, ·) and u(·, ·) + k, where k is a constant, lead to different household attitudes toward risk. The household's preferences are invariant, however, with respect to multiplicative transformations of the utility kernel.
We now turn to computing closed-form expressions for (45). Straightforward calculcations along the lines of Section 3 show that expressions (10)- (14) and (16) 
Relative risk aversion likewise continues to be given by Definitions 2-3, where V is understood to mean the more general formulation in (42) or (43), and where wealth is defined using the stochastic discount factor corresponding to Epstein-Zin preferences.
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Corollary 11. The household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion, evaluated at steady state, is given by:
The household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion, evaluated at steady state, is given by (c + w(l − l))/c times (47).
Examples
Example 3. Consider the additively separable utility kernel:
with generalized recursive preferences (43) and χ > 0, η > 0, and γ > 1, which was used by Rudebusch and Swanson (2009). 20 In this case, u(·, ·) < 0, risk aversion is decreasing in α, and α < 0 corresponds to preferences that are more risk averse than expected utility.
18 The household's Euler equation is given by:
The household's stochastic discount factor is given by:
. At steady state, however, this simplifies to the usual β. 20 We restrict attention here to the case γ > 1, consistent with Assumption 8. The case γ ≤ 1 can be considered if we place restrictions on the domain of c t and l t such that u(·, ·) < 0; one can always choose units for c t and l t such that this doesn't represent much of a constraint in practice. Of course, one can also consider alternative utility kernels with γ ≤ 1 for which u(·, ·) > 0.
In models without labor, period utility u(c t , l t ) = c
of relative risk aversion of γ + α(1 − γ), which we will refer to as the traditional measure. 21 Taking into account both the consumption and labor margins of (48), the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion (47) is given by:
using c ≈ wl. As in Example 1, the household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is not well defined in this example, so we restrict attention to the consumption-based measure (49).
As χ becomes large, household labor becomes less flexible and the bias from ignoring the labor margin shrinks to zero. As χ approaches zero, (49) Substituting (50) into (47), the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is:
21 Set η = 0 and λ = 0 and substitute (48) into (47). This is the case, for example, in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) , which do not have labor. In models with variable labor, Rudebusch and Swanson (2009) refer to γ + α(1 − γ) as the quasi coefficient of relative risk aversion.
while the leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is:
The latter agrees with the Van Binsbergen et al. (2010) measure of risk aversion, while the former is similar to (though not quite the same as) the Backus et al. (2008) measure. In this paper, we have provided the formal justification for both measures, (51) and (52). Note that the leisure-and-consumption-based measure of risk aversion corresponds to treating the Cobb-Douglas aggregate of consumption and leisure as a single, composite good.
Example 5. Tallarini (2000) considers an alternative Epstein-Zin specification:
with utility kernel:
We can compute the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for (53) by following along the steps in the proof of Proposition 9, which yields:
The other steps leading up to Proposition 10 are the same, so substituting in forṼ 1 andṼ 11 in (55) yields a consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion of:
The leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is χ, which again corresponds to treating consumption and leisure as a single, composite good.
Both coefficients of relative risk aversion differ from the value (χ+θ)/(1+θ) emphasized by Tallarini (2000) . Tallarini applies the traditional, one-good measure of risk aversion for Epstein-Zin preferences,
1+θ cu 1 , to the case where θ > 0 but labor is fixed. This ignores the fact that, when θ > 0, households will vary their labor endogenously in response to shocks. 
Risk Aversion with Habits
Many studies in macroeconomics and finance assume that households derive utility not from consumption itself, but from consumption relative to some reference level, or habit stock.
Habits, in turn, can have substantial effects on the household's attitudes toward risk (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher, 1997) . In this section, we investigate how habits affect risk aversion in the DSGE framework.
We generalize the household's utility kernel in this section to u(c t − h t , l t ), where h t denotes the household's reference level of consumption, or habits. We focus on an additive rather than multiplicative specification for habits because the implications for risk aversion are typically more interesting in the additive case.
If the habit stock h t is external to the household ("keeping up with the Joneses" utility), then the parameters that govern the process for h t can be incorporated into the exogenous state vector θ t , and the analysis proceeds essentially as in the previous sections. However, if the habit stock h t is a function of the household's own past levels of consumption, then the state variables of the household's optimization problem must be augmented to include the state variables that govern h t . We consider each of these cases in turn.
External Habits
When the reference consumption level h t in utility u(c t − h t , l t ) is external to the household, then the parameters that govern h t can be incorporated into the exogenous state vector θ t and the analysis of the previous sections carries over essentially as before. In particular, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion continues to be given by Proposition 1 in the case of expected utility and Proposition 9 for generalized recursive preferences. The household's intratemporal optimality condition (12) still implies (13)- (14), the household's Euler equation (15) The only real differences that arise relative to the case without habits is, first, that the steady-state point at which the derivatives of u(·, ·) are evaluated is (c − h, l) rather than (c, l), and second, that relative risk aversion confronts the household with a hypothetical gamble over c rather than c − h, which has a tendency to make the household more risk averse for a given functional form u(·, ·), because the stakes are effectively larger.
Example 6. Consider the case of expected utility with additively separable utility kernel:
where γ, χ, η > 0. The traditional measure of risk aversion for this example is −cu 11 /u 1 = γc/(c − h), which exceeds γ by a factor that depends on the importance of habits relative to consumption. The consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is:
When there is a labor margin in the model, the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion (58) is less than the traditional measure by the factor 1 + γc χ (c−h) , using wl ≈ c. Ignoring the labor margin in (58) thus leads to an even greater bias in the model with habits (h > 0) than without habits (h = 0). If γ = 2, χ = 1, and h = .8c, then the household's true risk aversion is less than the traditional measure by a factor of 11.
With generalized recursive preferences rather than expected utility preferences, the consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion for (57) is:
Again, the bias from ignoring the labor margin in (59) is even greater in the model with habits (h > 0) than without habits (h = 0).
Internal Habits
When habits are internal to the household, we must specify how the household's actions affect its future habits. We assume that the habit stock evolves according to the standard autoregressive process:
where ρ ∈ (−1, 1), b ∈ (0, 1), and ρ + b < 1 to ensure h < c in steady state.
With internal habits, the value of h t+1 depends on the household's choices in period t, so we write out the dependence of the household's value function on h t explicitly: We apply Definition 1 again and solve for the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion in exactly the same manner as Propositions 1 and 9:
Proposition 12. Let (a t ; h t ; θ t ) be an interior point of X and let V be given by (42) or (43). The household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion at (a t ; h t ; θ t ) exists and equals:
Evaluated at steady state, (62) simplifies to:
Proof: Essentially identical to the proof of Proposition 9.
Computing closed-form expressions for V 1 and V 11 in (63) follows the same general methodology as in Section 3, but is more complicated in the presence of internal habits because of the dynamic relationship between the household's current consumption and its future habits.
Proposition 13. The household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion in Proposition 12
, evaluated at steady state, is given by:
Corollary 14. The household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion, evaluated at steady state, is given by:
The household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion, evaluated at steady state, is given by (c + w(l − l))/c times (65).
Equations (64)- (65) have essentially the same form as the corresponding expressions in the model without habits.
Example 7. Consider the utility kernel of example 4.1:
where γ, χ, η > 0, but now with habits h t = bc t−1 internal to the household rather than external. In thise case, the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
where the last line uses β ≈ 1 and wl ≈ c.
The most striking feature of equation (67) is that it is independent of b, the importance of habits. This is in sharp contrast to the case of external habits, where risk aversion is strongly increasing in b (cf. equation (58)).
Risk Aversion Away from the Steady State
The simple, closed-form expressions for risk aversion derived above hold exactly only at the model's nonstochastic steady state. For values of (a t ; θ t ) away from steady state, these expressions are only approximations. In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of those approximations by computing risk aversion numerically for a standard real business cycle model.
There is a unit continuum of representative households in the model, each with optimization problem (1)- (3), with additively separable utility kernel (28) We set β = .99, γ = 2, and χ = 1.5, corresponding to an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5 and Frisch elasticity of 2/3. We set η = .4514 to normalize steady-state labor l = 1. We set φ = .7, δ = .025, ρ = .9, and σ ε = .01.
The household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion, evaluated at steady state, is given by (29). For the parameter values above, this implies a risk aversion coefficient of .9145, less than half the traditional measure of γ = 2. Away from the steady state, equations (8) and (10)- (17) remain valid, and we use them to compute the household's coefficient of relative risk aversion by solving for V 1 , V 11 , λ t , and ∂c * t /∂a t numerically (see the Appendix for details). Figure 2 graphs the result as a function of log(k t /k) and log A t over a wide range of values for these state variables, ±50 percentage points in logarithmic terms (equal to about 15 and 20 standard deviations of log k t and log A t , respectively).
23
The horizontal dashed black lines in Figure 2 report the constant, closed-form value for 23 The unconditional standard deviations of log A t and log(k t /k) are about 2.3 and 3.5 percent, respectively.
The ergodic mean of log A t is zero and that of log(k t /k) is about .01, or 1 percent. 24 Thus, the closedform expressions in Section 3 seem to provide a good approximation to the true level of household risk aversion in a standard model even far away from steady state.
In Figure 3 , we extend this analysis to the case of Epstein-Zin preferences with a much higher level of risk aversion. The specification of the model and parameter values are the same as above, but with generalized recursive preferences (43) instead of expected utility (4).
We set the Epstein-Zin curvature paramater α = −50, which implies a traditional measure of risk aversion of 52, but actual consumption-based relative risk aversion of about 37.8 (see Finally, it is worth noting that absolute risk aversion in these examples is countercyclical with respect to both k t and A t . figures with respect to k t because household wealth is increasing in k t and A t . Indeed, for higher k t , the increase in wealth is sufficiently large that the household's relative risk aversion increases with k t , even though absolute risk aversion is decreasing.
Discussion and Conclusions
The traditional measure of risk aversion, −cu 11 /u 1 , ignores the household's ability to partially offset shocks to asset returns with changes in hours worked. For reasonable parameterizations, the traditional measure can overstate risk aversion by a factor of three or more.
the state variables in Figure 3 because the much greater curvature of the model in this example reduces the accuracy of our numerical solution method outside this range.
Many studies in the macroeconomics, macro-finance, and international literatures thus may overstate the actual degree of risk aversion in their models by a substantial degree.
Risk aversion matters for asset pricing. Asset prices in dynamic models can behave very differently depending on how the household's labor margin is specified. If risk aversion is measured incorrectly because the labor margin is ignored, then risk premia in the model are more likely to be puzzling. An extreme example of this is when household utility has a zero discriminant-implying risk neutrality-even when the traditional measure of risk aversion is large.
Risk neutrality itself can be a desirable feature for some applications, such as labor market search or financial frictions, because risk neutrality allows for simple or closed-form solutions to key aspects of the model. The present paper suggests new ways to model risk neutrality that do not require linearity of utility in consumption, which has undesirable implications for interest rates and consumption growth. Instead, any utility kernel with a singular Hessian can be used.
It is also worth noting two implications that do not follow from the analysis in the present paper. First, the paper does not find that it is any harder or easier to match risk premia in dynamic equilibrium models with labor than it is in models without labor (recall Proposition 7). Second, the paper does not shed any light on what plausible empirical values for risk aversion might be. Empirical estimates of risk aversion based on surveys, changes in income or wealth, or cash prizes are generally just as valid in the framework of this paper as they are in dynamic models without labor.
Finally, many of the observations of the present paper apply not just to dynamic models with labor, but to any such model with multiple goods in the utility function. Models with home production, money in the utility function, or tradeable and nontradeable goods can all imply very different household attitudes toward risk than traditional measures of risk aversion would suggest. The simple, closed-form expressions for risk aversion derived in this paper, and the methods of the paper more generally, are potentially useful in any of these contexts, in pricing any asset-stocks, bonds, or futures, in foreign or domestic currency-within the framework of dynamic equilibrium models. Since these models are a mainstay of research in academia, at central banks, and international financial institutions, the applicability of the results should be widespread.
Finally, ε t+1 is independent of θ t+1 and a * t+1 , evaluating the latter at σ = 0. Since ε t+1 has unit variance, (A6) reduces to:
Equating (A2) to (A7) allows us to solve for dμ as a function of dσ 2 . Thus, the limit lim σ→0 2μ(σ)/σ 2 exists and is given by:
To evaluate (A8) at the nonstochastic steady state, set a t+1 = a and θ t+1 = θ to get:
Proof of Lemma 6
Differentiating the household's Euler equation (15) and evaluating at steady state yields:
which, applying (36), becomes: 
where dÂ t is as defined in Proposition 7. dÂ t exceeds dÃ t because even holding wealth constant (i.e., dÃ t = 0), the household can increase consumption in response to a rise in interest rates because the present value of the current consumption path is reduced. Dividing (A15) through byÃ gives:
which can be used in Corollary 8 instead of dÂ t /Ã. complicated discounting of future periods. Note first that (A28) can be used to solve for V 2 in terms of current and future marginal utility:
where F denotes the "generalized recursive" forward operator; that is,
The household's intratemporal optimality condition ((A29) combined with (A30)) implies: 
Finally, we can apply (1 − ρL) to both sides of (A42) to get: 
where the latter equaltiy follows because w = − 
Without habits or labor, an increase in assets would cause consumption to rise by the amount of the income flow from the change in assets-the "golden rule". The presence of habits attenuates this change by the amount βb/(1 − βρ) in the numerator, and the consumption response is further attenuated by the household's change in labor income, which is accounted for by the denominator of (A50). Equations (A29), (A30), (A47), and (A50) allow us to compute the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion in Proposition 10: 
27 In order to express (A51) in terms of u 1 and u 11 instead of u 2 and u 22 , we use V 1 = (1−β(ρ+b))u 1 /(β(1− βρ)) and differentiate the first-order condition:
V 1 (a t , h t ; θ t ) = (1 + r t ) (1 − βbF (1 − βρF ) −1 ) u 1 (c * τ − h τ , l * τ ), with respect to a t to solve for V 11 . model like (A53)-(A59) using a variety of numerical methods, including second-and fifth-order perturbation, and find that the perturbation solutions are among the most accurate methods globally, as well as being the fastest to compute. The perturbation solutions we compute for (A53)-(A64) are indistinguishable from one another after the third order over the range of values considered in Figure 2 , consistent with Taylor series convergence, so we report only the seventh-order solution in Figure 2 .
For the case of Epstein-Zin preferences, we first add equations defining the value function:
Next, replace (A55) and (A63) with their Epstein-Zin counterparts:
Finally, replace (A62) with the corresponding expression from Proposition 9:
The same numerical methods as before can then be applied.
